Abstract. In a centralized federation, in which tax rates and taxation rules are set by the federal government, manipulating the thoroughness of tax auditing and the effectiveness of tax collection could be attractive for regional authorities. In this article, we test for strategic tax collection empirically using data of the Russian Federation. Russia's regional authorities in the 1990s have always been suspected of tax auditing manipulations in their favour. However, in the 2000s, increasing bargaining power of the centre seems to induce tax collection bodies in the regions to manipulate tax auditing in favour of the federal centre. Our findings confirm the existence of strategic tax collection for the Yeltsin period; the results for the Putin period are however ambiguous.
INTRODUCTION
Economic analyses of decentralization usually focus on formal rules determining the allocation of public revenue, expenditure or fiscal responsibilities. It happens though that the de facto distribution of fiscal resources deviates substantially from what is set in the legal norms. Hence, it is important to distinguish between de facto and de jure fiscal decentralization and understand the reasons for the emergence of the gap. This article looks at one particular channel of distribution of fiscal resources which has not been explored in the literature. We show that in centralized federations in which the federal government sets tax rates and bases and regions have control over tax collection de facto fiscal decentralization can be driven by the manipulation of informal tax collection and tax auditing practices. De facto fiscal decentralization is defined as an increase in the de facto tax retention rate, that is, the share of tax revenue generated from a certain territory obtained by the regional government, and can vary across regions.
Specifically, there is no reason to believe that regions are equally thorough to enforce tax laws, when a larger share of tax revenue collected is attributed to the federal government, as compared with taxes, which mostly benefit regional budgets. One particular result of selective application of legal procedures is the emergence of tax arrears, which can be defined as the uncollected portion of taxes. We hypothesize that tax arrears mostly accumulate to the expense of the federal government, that is, taxes with a higher regional share are more actively collected than those mostly attributed to the centre. This behaviour results in de facto fiscal decentralization. It means that the de facto retention rates, that is, the split of the actually collected tax revenue between the regional and the central governments, will deviate from the de jure retention rates (i.e. the split of taxes between the central and the regional governments set-up by law). The federal centre, if it controls the tax authorities, can also be interested in a recentralization by manipulating tax collection effort without changing the formal rules of the game. In this sense, the behaviour of the tax authorities is strategic, that is, the distribution of effort between different taxes is not random, but rationally determined through the interaction of the regional/federal governments and the tax administrators.
To the best of our knowledge, this article is the first to empirically investigate strategic tax collection as a tool for de facto fiscal decentralization, as well as one of the first to address the issue of strategic tax collection at all. We test on strategic tax collection using data of the Russian Federation, which is an interesting case for such an analysis due to significant tax avoidance which forms the basis for selective tax auditing and collection. Moreover, unilateral devolution in the 1990s and recentralization in the 2000s allow for studying the impact of shifts of relative bargaining power between government levels. The downside of studying Russia consists of potential difficulties in modelling Russian federalism econometrically because of strong asymmetries across Russian regions. We employ a variety of estimation techniques to account for these challenges. Given the available data, we focus on strategic tax collection, that is, manipulation of efforts by tax authorities after uncovering the hidden part of the tax base that is supposed to be collected, and disregard strategic tax auditing, that is, manipulation of efforts to uncover the hidden part of the tax base in the first place.
This article contributes to two strands of the literature. First, there has been relatively small and mostly theoretical research on determinants of strategic tax collection and tax auditing by regional governments in centralized federations (Cai and Treisman, 2004; Cremer and Gahvari, 2000; St€ owhase and Traxler, 2005; Traxler and Reutter, 2008) , though the reasons for the strategic behaviour hypothesized in the literature have often been very different from that of this article. The claim that some regional governments are relatively lax in their tax auditing as compared with others has been made for Germany (Baretti et al., 2002; Boenke et al., 2011) , Belgium (Cremer and Gahvari, 2000) , Japan (Ishida, 2012) and Spain (Duran-Cabre et al., 2012; Esteller-More, 2005 , 2011 . However, the empirical research on strategic tax collection is still very limited, especially because it is difficult to come up with a reasonable proxy for tax collection and auditing activity. Russia provides us with a variable rendering empirical research in this field possible, that is, reported size of tax arrears. Some papers use this advantage in different micro-and macro-level settings (Ponomareva and Zhuravskaya, 2004; Slinko et al., 2005; Treisman, 1998 Treisman, , 2003 , but the impact of strategic tax collection on fiscal decentralization has not been explored so far. Second, this article contributes to the growing body of research dealing with a positive analysis of factors of decentralization (e.g. Arzaghi and Henderson, 2005; Feld et al., 2008; Panizza, 1999; Stegarescu, 2006) . Considering the impact of strategic tax collection on fiscal decentralization, it thus uncovers one of the rarely analysed mechanisms determining the empirical variation of the decentralization indicators.
As for any empirical investigation focused on a particular country case, the question regarding external validity of our results arises. The Russian case is unique in the sense that, given the data availability, an econometric test of strategic tax collection is possible (although with certain caveats). However, other ingredients of the logic studied in this article -high tax evasion, high level of de jure fiscal decentralization and informal regional control over subnational agencies of the central government -have been present in other countries of the world as well. Existence of informal decentralization complementary to or competing with the formal rules of centre-region relations has been documented by Jones Luong (2004) for Kazakhstan, Way (2002) for Ukraine, and Malesky (2008) and Vu et al. (2012) for Vietnam. An important case is China, where subnational governments less often manipulate budgetary revenue (like in the Russian case), but rather create extra-budgetary revenues as an unforeseen consequence of the lack of central control (Zhan, 2012) . Hence, our analysis may have implications going beyond the Russian case.
This article is organized as follows: section 2 describes the basic logic of strategic tax collection in centralized federations with different allocations of de facto bargaining power between levels of government, clarifies the concepts of tax auditing and tax collection, presents a simple model of strategic tax collection and shows why Russia is a good laboratory for studying this effect. Section 3 describes the data and the econometric methodology. Section 4 presents our findings and discusses their potential implications. The last section offers some conclusions.
STRATEGIC TAX COLLECTION IN A CENTRALIZED FEDERATION:
WHAT IS IT ABOUT?
Definitions
The existing literature on strategic tax auditing (St€ owhase and Traxler, 2005) models the auditing effort as a probability p of detection of tax evasion. For our purposes, we transform the approach as follows. Assume that there exists a population of firms in the economy with overall real profit p R (instead of profit one could consider any other tax base); however, the officially declared profit, which should be used as the tax base, is p D < p R . The government implements tax auditing measures to find out real profit; then on average, assuming the detection probability p, the uncovered profit of the firms after tax auditing is
The probability p does not merely depend on the resources and capabilities of the tax authority, but is selected by the tax authority given the de jure retention rates and affects the de facto retention rates.
However, the fact that the tax authority claims a certain under-reported tax base does not imply that this additional tax base can be taxed and penalties can be applied. For instance, the decision of the tax authority can be challenged in court. The courts often face cases, when their decisions are not straightforward and unambiguous. Loopholes in tax laws in developing countries and extreme complexity of the tax system in many developed countries provide for opportunities to challenge tax auditing results. In some sense, the decision of the court depends on the effort expended in preparing the case by the tax authority. In addition to this legal procedure, there exists an entire array of unofficial measures, which can be used by the tax authority and the taxpayers in most developing countries with uncontrolled bureaucracy. Taxpayers can attempt to transfer property and money from one legal entity to another before the attachment of property and suspension of transactions were introduced, or use shell firms. The tax authority may request the support of other public agencies to pressure the taxpayer: for example, to orchestrate an excessive number of audits by other agencies or threaten the taxpayers arguing that it will pay more attention to the company in the future, if it does not comply now. This threat sometimes deters taxpayers from filing a lawsuit even if they expect to win (Buhgalteria, 2001) . All these additional activities are costly for both taxpayers and the tax authority in terms of their effort as well.
Therefore, ultimately, tax auditing is complemented by tax collection. So, the already detected tax is collected with a certain probability (r), which is, in turn, a function of two choice variables: effort by the taxpayers and by the tax authority. Then, the tax base used for calculating the taxes due is
pr, while the difference between this tax base and the detected tax base 1 À r
represents the uncollected tax arrears, which could be observed empirically (as opposed to the not uncovered tax evasion, representing the outcomes of the tax auditing as such), if the tax authority makes the respective data publicly available (what is, however, only rarely the case). This structure of the tax base is summarized in Figure 1 .
How does it work?
By choosing the optimal effort, the tax authority faces a number of constraints. While in the developed countries all or almost all taxes can be collected and there is less space for strategic behaviour of the tax authority, this is different in countries with weak institutions. The problems of tax collection are likely to be overwhelming, so that the tax authority is simply unable (given its personnel and financing) to accurately prepare for all lawsuits. Even if the pressure on the tax authority is not overwhelming, the tax collectors have low incentives to work properly and could leave some tax arrears just to reduce the personal work- 
Hidden part of the tax base π R -π load. Under these conditions, the tax authority will give priority, in terms of the allocation of its effort, to different taxpayers and taxes. The main hypothesis underlying our approach is that when facing these constraints, tax authorities will not just randomly pick some companies and taxes and concentrate on them while performing their tasks. On the contrary, they will collect specific taxes more accurately and others rather lax. The choice of these taxes can be driven by various factors: for example, some taxes are easier to collect (and require less effort), or are paid by taxpayers prone to bribes. Tax collection effort is also influenced by political economy considerations associated with the incentives for the public bureaucracy. Put differently, the allocation of effort depends on the solution of the principal-agent problem between the government as the principal and the tax authority as the agent.
The situation is more difficult when the tax authority has to respond to multiple competing principals, that is, in a federal country where taxpayers have to pay taxes for multiple governments and all taxes are collected by the same tax authority. Depending on the relative incentives provided by the federal and the regional administrations (career concerns, side payments, punishments, etc.), tax authorities could be more 'rigorous' by collecting either the federal or the regional taxes. In case the federal administration is more important for bureaucrats, they are more likely to invest effort in federal taxes and therefore will pay less attention to the tax collection for the regional budget. If the power relations are reversed, regional taxes become more important.
Under these conditions, strategic tax collection is likely to have an impact on the allocation of the de facto tax revenue between the federal and the regional governments as clarified by the following model (it should be noted that the model is based on numerous simplified assumptions and merely serves to illustrate the general logic of our argument). Assume a region, where a single tax agency collects taxes for a central and a regional government. Assume that there exist two taxes (a central and a regional tax) which have exactly the same tax rate t imposed on a tax base T, such that the tax bases for the federal and regional taxes are equal to each other. The de jure retention rate is therefore assumed to be 50%; notice that the de jure retention rate is unambiguously determined by the statutory tax rates. Let s denote the de facto retention rate. In case of zero tax evasion s = tT/2tT = 0.5. If tax evasion exists, let a C be the share of the central tax base hidden from the tax collectors, and a R the share of the regional tax base (exogenous in this model). The tax agency can expend effort in uncovering tax fraud. Denote e R and e C effort expended in uncovering regional and central tax fraud, respectively, such that the tax base actually taxed is T(1 À a j + ke j ) for the government j. We assume that the effort the tax authority can expend for tax collection is limited to e C + e R = E, which represents the resources of the tax agency. k measures the effectiveness of tax collection, and is assumed to be the same for both taxes.
Furthermore, we assume e j E j for all j. It means that there also exists an upper boundary on how much effort can be invested in collecting each of the taxes. This assumption is the simplest way to capture the fact that for particular types of taxes the collection costs may be prohibitively high, so that there exists a de facto upper boundary on how much tax arrears can be reduced at all; further effort results in negligible gains and enormous personal effort for tax collectors, who therefore would never implement it. Furthermore, collecting particular taxes may require specific human and social capital (e.g. the knowledge of particular forms of tax evasion and legal requirements; the ability to coordinate one's action with other agencies involved in tax collection, etc.). If the tax collectors in the region have a different specialization, it is impossible for the tax collector to spend more effort on collecting a particular tax than the upper boundary defined above. In general, E C + E R > E, otherwise there would be no discretion of the tax-collecting agency regarding the allocation of its effort whatsoever. We assume kE j < a j for all j -that is, even if the entire possible effort is invested into collecting a particular tax, still some tax arrears remain. Finally, E j < E for all jhence, the tax collector cannot spend its entire effort only on collecting either federal or regional taxes (since in reality tax collectors should be more likely to concentrate on particular taxes, but still spend some effort on collecting other taxes).
Although the de jure retention rate is fixed and equal to 50%, de facto changes in effort of the tax authority can substantially change the allocation of tax revenue. The de facto retention rate is thus given by
By increasing effort in collecting regional taxes, ceteris paribus, the tax agency ensures that the retention rate goes up; if the effort decreases, the retention rate decreases.
Assume that the only decision the tax agency takes is the allocation of effort between central and regional taxes. Strategic tax collection implies that this allocation decision is not random and depends on the incentives set by the central and the regional government. Let these incentives be defined as monetary payments set proportional to the total tax collected for the budget of a particular government. If i C and i R denote central and regional incentive payments, the problem of the tax agency can thus be written as
The incentives are set by the governments in the following way: the government j solves the problem
It means that it maximizes the portion of tax revenue remaining after incentive payments have been provided to the tax collector. The constraint of this optimization problem describes the resources available to the federal and the regional governments for providing incentives for tax agencies. The variation in government resources is reflected by the fact that I is larger for one government than for the other. We also assume that I C and I R are small enough so that we A. Libman and L. P. Feld can exclude cases in which it is more attractive for the government to provide no incentives to the tax collectors whatsoever than to offer the highest possible I j , when it results in the tax collectors expending their entire efforts for collecting taxes for this particular government.
The timing of events is as follows. First, the central government determines the incentives for the tax collectors. Second, the regional government sets its incentive. Third, the tax collector determines how much effort to allocate for each of the taxes. Finally, the taxes are collected and payoffs are realized. The promises made by central and regional governments are binding, meaning that both governments have to provide the incentive payments they have offered to the tax-collecting agency once taxes are collected.
First, consider the optimal allocation of effort by the tax agency given its incentives. For this purpose, one can see that the optimization problem of the tax collector is actually a linear function of the effort invested in collecting a particular tax. Then, if i C > i R the optimization problem of the tax agency is increasing in e C , and thus, the tax collector sets e C = E C and e R = E À E C . In the opposite case, e R = E R and e C = E À E R . For the case of equal incentives, the tax collector is indifferent and the tax collection effort is allocated in equal proportions.
Next, let us consider the optimization problem of the regional government. Assume that the resources of the central government available for providing incentives to the tax collector are smaller than those of the regional government, that is, I
C < I R . Then, for any incentive the central government can offer to the tax collector, the regional government's best response is to make a bid which is by a small number e larger than that by the central government, and it is always possible for any offer of incentive payments made by the central government. Finally, let us turn to the central government. If I C < I R , the central government loses for any offer of incentive payment it makes (the region sets a higher incentive). As the central government is obliged to pay the promised incentive payment to the tax collector even if it loses, the equilibrium of the model is as follows: the federal government sets incentives equal to zero (because it loses anyway), the region sets incentives equal to the smallest possible non-negative number ɛ and the tax authority expends its entire effort in the regional tax.
For the case I C > I R , the situation is reversed. The regional government's best response to the federal government's incentive is to offer an incentive which is larger by ɛ. This is however not always feasible. If it is not feasible (i.e. the federal government bids more than I R ), the regional government's best response is to offer zero. The federal government, in turn, is ready to offer up to I C as an incentive for tax collector (given the assumptions above). In equilibrium, the federal government offers an incentive of I R + ɛ, the regional government sets its incentives equal to zero, and the entire effort of the tax authority is expended in collecting federal taxes.
There are several predictions of our model, which we can now derive. First, I C < I R results in de facto decentralization, that is, the de facto retention rates increases, even if the de jure retention rate remains constant. For I C > I R the opposite holds. Second, for given I C and I R , we can derive the impact of E on s. Consider the case I C > I R . Then, the tax collector expends all its efforts in collecting federal taxes, as much as it is possible given constraint E C . Then, if E Strategic Tax Collection increases, and E C remains constant or grows very slowly, s increases. On the contrary, if I C < I R , if E increases and E R remains constant or grows very slowly, s decreases. Note that regions with large E should have smaller tax arrears, and therefore, for I C > I R , large tax arrears should ceteris paribus be associated with smaller retention rates; for I C < I R this relation is reversed.
Requirements for an empirical strategy
To test this prediction empirically, it is necessary to devise a strategy satisfying a number of requirements. Contrary to the example in our model, states in a federation are not identical, and what is particularly important, not identical in terms of the retention rates regions should have obtained in case of perfectly responsible and legal behaviour of the tax authorities. First, the statutory retention rates in some federations are explicitly set differently for some of the states. Second, the statutory retention rates change over time as a consequence of fiscal reforms and policy adjustments. Third, the retention rate depends on the structure of the tax base, assuming the split of revenue between federal and regional governments is different for different taxes. To empirically test the existence of the strategic tax collection, one has to identify the marginal effect of the increase in tax arrears on the actual retention rates, ceteris paribus, given statutory retention rates and the tax structure. The tax structure can be captured using appropriate controls representing the tax base. These controls also capture the technical simplicity of collecting particular taxes. If the statutory retention rates are the same for all regions and change over time, they can be captured by time fixed effects. Furthermore, one also has to control for the relative strength of the regional governments in the regressions (and/or apply region fixed effects, if the power resources do not change over time). There is usually no period of strong power or of weak power in the history of the federation: there will be stronger and weaker regions co-existing at each period of time. To come up with a plausible hypothesis regarding the sign of the relation between tax arrears and retention rates, we have to control for region-specific power factors, so that we observe the impact of an increase in tax arrears on the retention rate for an average region in the federation, for which these general claims about stronger power of the centre could be applied.
The Russian case
To test for the presence of strategic tax collection, several elements should be present: first, a high centralization of fiscal authorities, but possible decentralization of tax administration is necessary. Second, tax arrears should be the rule rather than the exception in this environment, because of bad quality of public administration and/or huge tax avoidance. Third, we need a somewhat plausible story claiming that the central government is more powerful than the regional one, or vice versa, or preferably both for different periods of the history of the federation. As it will be shown in what follows, Russia fits these three requirements.
First, the Russian fiscal system is highly centralized since 1994. The list of taxes, tax bases and rates are set (with some minor exceptions) by the federal A. Libman and L. P. Feld parliament for both regional and federal levels. Moreover, the tax administration is implemented by the federal authority. However, in spite of this high centralization, and also the fact that the de jure retention rates were set homogeneously for the entire federation (with some exceptions), the asymmetries in the de facto tax revenue distribution across regions are enormous. Between 1994 and 2006, the share of taxes that the centre received from different regions varied from practically zero to more than 95%. The standard deviation of shares of tax collection de facto attributed to regional budgets increased significantly throughout the period of observation (Figure 2 ), in spite of political centralization of Russia under Vladimir Putin (see also Freinkman et al., 2011) .
Second, during the last two decades, tax evasion in Russia remained very high (Alm et al., 2006; Mironov, 2006; Wintrobe, 2001; Yakovlev, 1999) . Not only tax auditing has been problematic in Russia, tax collection has also been difficult (Shleifer and Treisman, 2000; Treisman, 1998) .
Third, with respect to the relative power of regional and federal governments regarding tax authorities and their resources, the Russian Federation experienced two distinct periods of development. In the 1990s, the regional governments were able to establish control over the local tax authorities determining their behaviour, which became practically independent from the federal centre. After 2000, the new federal government of Putin re-established control over the regional branches of its agencies, including the tax collectors. One of the advantages of the empirical case studied in this article is that both periods could be identified so clearly. Putin's advancement to power was unpredicted by the political elite and the population, was extremely fast and resulted in an almost immediate shift of power in the federal structure (Hyde, 2001; Ross, 2003) . Hence, we have identified one period of regional and one period of federal dominance and are able to formulate two conjectures regarding the relation between tax arrears and retention rates: • Conjecture 1: In the 1990s (under Yeltsin's presidency), regions with higher tax arrears are more likely to exhibit ceteris paribus higher fiscal decentralization in terms of tax revenue attributed to the federal centre.
• Conjecture 2: In the 2000s (under Putin's presidency), regions with higher tax arrears are more likely to exhibit ceteris paribus lower fiscal decentralization in terms of tax revenue attributed to the federal centre.
These conjectures are also consistent with descriptive data reported in the literature: Betin et al. (2004) , for instance, report that while in 1998 and 1999 the growth of tax arrears accrued by the federal budget exceeded that by the regional budgets (in 1998 the respective increase was 2.1 and 0.8% of GDP, in 1999 0.7 and 0.1%), in 2000 the situation was reversed (with growth of federal tax arrears accounting for 0.1% of GDP and of regional tax arrears for 0.4% of GDP; in 2001 regional tax arrears went down by 0.5% of GDP, while federal did not change).
It should be noted that Putin's administration was associated with three further changes: fast economic growth after the transition recession of the 1990s, certain improvements of the quality of the tax administration and a relative recentralization of the de jure taxation (see Owen and Robinson, 2003) . The improved economic conditions can be captured by respective controls (e.g. income per capita). Two other processes -the improvement of the quality of tax administration and the de jure centralization of taxation -affected all regions simultaneously, and can be captured by time fixed effects. Moreover, the de jure centralization started two years after the beginning of Putin's presidency, while the informal changes in the bureaucracy have been introduced almost immediately. Thus, under the caveats described above the conjectures form a meaningful guideline for the empirical investigation.
Transfers
A strong simplification of the picture drawn above is that it does not account for the presence of transfers. Russia has a fiscal equalization scheme which was established by the 1994-95 budget reform. It is a purely vertical equalization mechanism; there is no horizontal fiscal equalization. The federal grants comprise two main types: transfers from the Fund for Financial Support of the Regions (FFSR) and 'other' transfers. The FFSR transfers are formula based and allocated to the regions, with the formula focusing on two characteristics: fiscal capacity and fiscal needs of the regions. Fiscal capacity is calculated based on some macroeconomic variables approximating the tax base; for example, in 2000, it was based on the gross regional product (GRP) and on industrial structure. Fiscal needs are based on the projected public expenditures, taking cost of living, infrastructural development, climate, etc. into account (see Jarocinska, 2010) . Based on the comparison of fiscal capacity and fiscal needs, the transfer is allocated. The second group of transfers, which was actually increasing in terms of its share in the overall transfers under Putin (Yakovlev et al., 2011) , is allocated based on individual decisions of the central government, for example, as a tool of promoting economic development or supporting individual regions.
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Thus, they are discretionary and do not follow a predefined formula. A large literature on fiscal equalization in Russia (Jarocinska, 2010; Popov, 2004; Yakovlev et al., 2011) demonstrates that political considerations play a substantial role in the allocation of transfers: for example, the central government can use them to buy loyalty of individual governors and regional elites.
Federal transfers matter for this paper because, if a share of federal tax revenue is transferred to the regional budget, the regional government is not only interested in reducing regional tax arrears but also interested in reducing federal tax arrears, which then serve as a source of transfers. Instead of attempting to provide incentives to the tax collector, as we have argued above, the subnational government could focus on lobbying the central government, attempting to receive larger transfers: for example, it could use the threat of secession (which played an important role in Russia in the 1990s and for some regions of the Northern Caucasus in the 2000s), the danger of unfavourable outcomes for incumbent candidates and parties in the region at the federal elections or the personal ties to the members of the central administration. The existence of transfers from the federal government therefore creates another challenge for the empirical investigation. The behaviour of regions receiving large and small transfers may be different. Thus, it is necessary to establish the correlation between tax arrears and retention rates ceteris paribus, given the federal transfers paid to the region. Thus, all regressions we run include the total amount of federal transfers paid. Unfortunately, this variable can also be endogenous: the FFSR transfers can be affected by retention rates as well, if, for instance, the latter is linked to the effectiveness of public policy in the region, which in turn influences a region's fiscal capacity and fiscal needs (this problem for Russia is discussed in what follows). To deal with this problem, we run all regressions with and without fiscal transfers and treat our results as robust only in case they survive both specifications; in this article, we report the results where regressions control for transfers.
ECONOMETRIC MODEL AND DATA
Our empirical model can be formulated as follows:
where RR refers to the retention rate of region i in time period t; TA to tax arrears of this region; PUTIN to a dummy equal to 1 for the period of Putin presidency and zero otherwise; TB to a vector of tax base variables; POLITICS to political control variables and f to the region-specific fixed effect. The model therefore checks whether tax arrears affect the region-specific de facto retention rate, and how these effects differ between the Yeltsin and Putin presidential periods. We expect b 1 to be positive, because tax arrears under Yeltsin are hypothesized to accumulate mostly for federal taxes. This effect should disappear under Putin, so that b 3 is expected to be negative. If the absolute value of b 1 and b 3 is roughly the same, it implies that the effect of strategic tax collection, observed under
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Yeltsin, disappears under Putin. If the absolute value of b 3 is larger than of b 1 , it provides evidence of strategic tax collection under Putin as well, but now used by the federal government in its favour. More specifically, we compute the marginal effects and the associated standard errors for the tax arrears for either PU-TIN = 0 or PUTIN = 1 and focus on the interpretation of these variables. We also use a slightly modified version of the regression model above, which can be formulated as follows:
In this case, we include two tax arrears variables in the regression: under Yeltsin and under Putin. Both are equal to tax arrears for the periods of administration of the respective president and zero otherwise. We expect b 1 to be positive and significant and b 2 to be negative and significant. As we will show below, however, the results of both specifications are highly consistent. We will refer in what follows to the model (4) as the 'interaction term model' and the model (5) as the 'model with Yeltsin and Putin tax arrears'.
As the basic specification, we run panel data regressions with Newey-West corrected standard errors and cross-section fixed effects. Moreover, we estimate a specification with time and region fixed effects, thus addressing potential shifts over time. Our inference is mostly based on the two-way fixed effects specification, because the unobserved heterogeneity is crucial for this article. In this case, however, we drop the Putin dummy in the model (4), as it is perfectly collinear with the time fixed effects, but keep all other terms of the model. Since we control for time fixed effects, this adjustment does not lead to omitted variable bias and still allows for estimating the effects we are interested in.
The analysis covers the period of 1995-2006 (12 years) and all regions of the Russian Federation excluding nine autonomous okrugs and the Chechen Republic for which no reliable data are available. Thus, we observe 79 regions annually. Since we had to exclude three observations due to data problems, we have a slightly unbalanced panel dataset. For three regions, retention rates larger than 100% were obtained; the data seem to result from statistical artefacts of comparing information of different sources and were also excluded.
Our dependent variable is obtained by dividing the revenue of the regional government from taxation originating from a certain region by the overall tax revenue from its territory. We use the consolidated regional government including both the government of the region and local governments. A higher share represents less centralization as defined above. One can see that this measure captures exactly the variation in the de facto retention rates, since we look at the actual tax revenue and not at the statutory split of taxes set-up in legal acts.
Our key independent variable is the tax arrears reported by the federal statistical agency for each region and year, which include (1) tax obligations, which are claimed by the tax authorities, but were not paid by the taxpayer, (2) restructured tax liabilities (e.g. when the payment of taxes was officially delayed), (3) tax liabilities not collected in due time because of the bankruptcy of the taxpayer, (4) tax liabilities, currently under collection by the court executives A. Libman and L. P. Feld (bailiffs) and (5) liabilities from halted tax collection activities. This measure has certain advantages and disadvantages. For example, it can also be influenced by events like bankruptcy of large taxpayers or erroneous claims of tax authorities, which could be later suspended by the court. And, once again, one should be aware that the measure does not account for the overall economic activity, which the tax authorities failed to uncover: thus, it does not represent the tax auditing. However, it is a good proxy for tax collection as defined above.
Tax arrears accumulate for all taxes due to all levels of government of the Russian Federation. The reason is the existence of joint taxation which in fact forms the main revenue source for regional governments. Any joint tax can be more or less attractive for regional governments (or for the federal centre) assuming a different distribution of tax revenue: therefore, the tax collection effort could vary. It is probably helpful to assume that different taxes are more or less attractive for different levels of government as opposed to each other rather than to use a dichotomy of 'attractive' or 'not attractive' forms of taxation. Unfortunately, no information on tax arrears for individual taxes on the regional level is available throughout the period of the study.
We use a broad set of control variables. First, we include two variables accounting for differences in tax base endowments among the regions. We control for variables roughly representing two sources of taxation: the flow of economic activity (income) and the stock of economic assets (capital funds). We also include control variables capturing political bargaining power and preferences of the regional elite vis-a-vis the federal centre. The set of political variables applied is fairly standard in the literature dealing with the decentralization in Russia and is mostly derived from Libman (2010) , corrected by the fact that we use a fixed-effects specification and therefore do not include time-invariant variables. We control for (1) the economic potential of the region captured by the population and the size of oil and gas extraction (the latter is expressed in coal equivalents to make the energy value of oil and gas extracted comparable); (2) the size of fiscal transfers from the federal budget and (3) the heterogeneity of preferences of a particular region vis-a-vis the rest of the federation captured by urbanization and the Carnegie Center index of the democratization of the regional political systems.
Since Russian regions vary a lot in terms of their socioeconomic characteristics, it may be helpful to normalize the explanatory variables. We use three approaches to normalization: (1) absolute values of the covariates (no normalization), (2) covariates divided by the population of the region (per capita values) and (3) covariates divided by the GRP of the region. Normalization applies to the following variables: tax arrears, income (except the normalization per unit of GRP, where normalization would change the interpretation of the covariate, as discussed below), capital funds, oil and gas extraction, and fiscal transfers. All covariates expressed in monetary terms have been recalculated to the 1995 prices using the inflation rate reported in the World Development Indicators. As it is usually the case with research dealing with developing economies, we have to acknowledge possible limitations of the quality of data. However, we do not believe the data to be prohibitively contaminated in the Russian case. All fiscal flows in Russia are processed by a federal institution (Federal Treasury) established in 1992-93, which has the entire information on taxation, but is not involved in tax collection or spending. The same holds for the federal statistical agency Rosstat, which has no links to regional governments and directly receives information from companies and households. Table 1 reports key descriptive statistics for the main right-hand and left-hand side variables. Under Putin, the average retention rate declined significantly, although the variation increased. Although the average annual tax arrears increased in 1995-99, and then decreased in 2000-06, the difference of the means between these two periods is insignificant. Thus, the improvement of the tax administration reported so far does not seem to reduce tax arrears, and the concern regarding the omitted variable bias caused by tax reforms cannot be substantiated. Table 2 furthermore provides the within and the between variation of the main variables for the whole sample and for both presidencies. One can see that for the entire period, the contribution of the within and the between variation to the total variation of the variables is almost identical; for some of the variables and subperiods within variation is smaller than between variation, but still quite substantial. Thus, using panel data fixed effects, as we intend to do in this article, is justified.
RESULTS

Main results
Tables 3 and 4 summarize the main results for all three approaches to normalization; the baseline results are those of specification (1) for region fixed effects and (5) for two-way fixed effects, with other specifications representing robustness checks to be discussed below. We do not report the detailed regression tables in the body of the article to concentrate on the main findings. The results are striking. In the interaction term model, we find a significant and positive effect of tax arrears and a significant and negative effect of the interaction term between tax arrears and Putin dummy. The Putin dummy in specification (1) is significant and negative. The absolute value of the b coefficients for the tax arrears and for the interaction term is almost identical. These results allow for the following interpretation. First, under Yeltsin larger tax arrears are associated with higher The findings support the claim that under Yeltsin increasing tax arrears were associated with higher devolution. Strong regions used the captured tax administrations to ensure that regional taxes received a priority treatment while collecting the taxes. The absence of results with respect to Conjecture 2 indicates that the central government during its periods of strength did not really rely on strategic tax collection; there is no evidence that the regional tax administrations differentiated their attention with respect to federal and to regional taxes, that is, tax arrears accrued on costs of both central and regional budgets. Probably, the de jure recentralization of taxation was sufficient to satisfy the objectives of the central government. The effect under Yeltsin is economically substantial: an increase in tax arrears per unit of GRP by one standard deviation (for the Yeltsin period) results in an increase of the retention rate by 3 percentage points. We should, however, point out that the obtained evidence for strategic tax collection is indirect and plagued by a number of econometric problems, which we discuss in the next section.
Endogeneity and outliers
The regressions so far made two important simplifications, which both can be challenged and require additional econometric analysis. First, the asymmetric character of Russian federalism is likely to induce problems of outliers. We address this issue using two main tools. On one hand, we estimate least absolute deviation (median) regressions, which are known to be more robust to samples with significant outliers. On the other hand, we repeat all estimations excluding observations with very large values of tax arrears and with known atypical tax policies. In particular, we exclude three regions: Kalmykia, Ingushetia and Altai Republic. These regions during the 1990s served as internal tax havens in Russia providing a more favourable tax regime for companies incorporated in these jurisdictions. The need to exclude these outliers even in a region fixed effects A. Libman and L. P. Feld A. Libman and L. P. Feld specification is supported by a Chow breakpoint test. 1 Hence, the effect of these three outliers is not captured completely by the intercept changes (implied by cross-section fixed effects); there is a strong effect on the slope.
Second, we address the potential endogeneity bias due to a reverse causality problem (fiscal decentralization may influence tax collection behaviour), although there are reasons for scepticism regarding reverse causality. In general, reverse causality in the case of this article could originate from two sources. On one hand, the effort of the tax collection agencies controlled by a particular government could be influenced by the residual claims of this government on the tax revenue generated, that is, by the retention rates (Weingast, 2009 ). On the other hand, there may also be an indirect effect of retention rates on tax arrears if public spending of a particular level of government is significantly more efficient than of its counterparts (although this should be captured by our controls). For the first possibility of endogeneity to be valid, there should exist a variation in ex ante de jure retention rates, which the regional governments should react to. This is not the case in Russia: with some exceptions (which will be discussed below), ex ante retention rates are exactly the same for all regions of the federation. Thus, the de jure residual claim of the government associated with an increase of the tax collector's effort is the same for all regions as well, and cannot drive differences in tax collection effort. Only ex post retention rates differ, but these differences result from strategic tax collection, as the model in Section 2 shows. Furthermore, if the retention rates (through larger residual claims of the regional government) drive the tax collection effort, it should be negatively correlated with the size of tax arrears under Yeltsin, so the prediction is exactly the opposite to Conjecture 1 (and to the empirical results reported above). As for the second possibility of endogeneity, in the Russian case, both public spending of the federal and the regional governments are often claimed to be highly inefficient, and thus, it is difficult to claim that differences in the retention rates across regions should result in stronger economic asymmetries. The existing empirical research (Ahrend, 2005; Desai et al., 2005; Mau and Yanovsky, 2002 ) is inconclusive in this respect.
Nevertheless, to check for robustness of the results to potential endogeneity, we use an instrumental variables estimator. Specifically, we look at the tax arrears as influenced by the capacity of the federal administration in the regions to conduct its policies (either externally restricted or determined by the quality of bureaucrats). Hence, appropriate instruments could be the variables describing the administrative capacity (both in terms of resources and performance) of the federal agencies operating in the region assuming that the tax collection is correlated with other branches of federal agencies. We use three variables as instruments: the number of federal bureaucrats working in the region; number of crimes committed in the region (since the law enforcement is also a federal affair in Russia) and the number of fixed line telephones in the region (as a proxy for the infrastructure necessary for governing the region). In contrast, these variables are unlikely to have an impact on the retention rates. Consider, for instance, the number of federal bureaucrats: the overall size of the federal administration is a function of the revenue of the federal government (and hence, of the distribution of taxes between regions and the centre), but in each particular region, the decisions of the federal administration regarding the size of the representation are independent of the retention rate (resources from other regions are very likely to be used). Also the tax collection is (formally) a federal affair, and hence, there is no need to appoint more federal officials to supervise and monitor the regional ones in this area. For the crime rates and fixed line telephones, the direct connection to the retention rates seems to be even less likely. Since the Hansen J is insignificant, we rely on the over identification to justify the exogeneity of the instruments. The quality of instruments varies, however, for different normalizations; the F-statistics are, unfortunately, lower than ten, so that we deal with weak instruments, and therefore, our approach provides only tentative argumentation in favour of the results of this article.
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The results are reported in Tables 3 and 4 : our findings remain robust almost through all changes in estimation techniques. We have to stress, still, that our solution to the endogeneity problem is imperfect, given both weakness of the instruments and possible questions to the theoretical logic we use.
Robustness checks
In addition, we also implement a broad set of robustness checks to validate our results. Somewhat simplified, they can be attributed to one of four groups: changes in the composition of controls, transformation of dependent and independent variables, further analysis of outliers and other robustness checks. Although these caveats do not entirely rule out the econometric problems discussed above, they provide further evidence reinforcing our conclusions.
In terms of the composition of controls, first, we drop all time-varying covariates and regress retention rates merely on tax arrears. Second, since fiscal transfers are endogenous to the retention rates, we re-estimate all regressions excluding this variable. Third, we drop all political variables (accounting for possible measurement error by capturing the vague notion of the bargaining power and preference heterogeneity). Fourth, we estimate specifications with a couple of additional control variables: (1) the share of dominant enterprises operating in the region (the Russian statistical agency reported this data in 1997-2002) and (2) a dummy for the so-called 'Red Belt' regions, that is, territories with mostly Communist governors during the 1990s. In terms of the transformation of dependent and independent variables, first, since the dependent variable is bounded between zero and one, we perform a log-odds transformation for the retention rate. Second, we also esti-2. Using additional variables suggested, for example, by Treisman's (2003) specification for the determinants of tax arrears (share of agriculture and share of dominant enterprises -for the last variable, we had to use a shorter time span given the availability of data) those turn out to be much weaker as instruments. In particular, in this case, the Hansen J-test statistics is often significant, questioning the exclusion restriction for these additional instruments. 3. More specifically, we included a control equal to one for the Yeltsin period and Red Belt regions and zero otherwise, since under Putin most 'Communist' governors were either gradually replaced or turned into supporters of the president.
A. Libman and L. P. Feld mate regression with squared tax arrears, squared and linear tax arrears and log tax arrears to account for possible fixed costs of tax collection effort and concave punishment by the government (when the governments tolerate small deviations, but are vicious about punishing the large ones), as well as other sources of non-linearities. In addition, we estimate all regressions with lagged variables. These estimations are helpful as tax collection of the current year is partly calculated on the basis of past year's revenues, which can be captured by an additional analysis, and may contribute to the attempt to avoid the endogeneity problem. However, according to our knowledge of Russia's fiscal system, taxes are usually collected throughout the year rather than next year (even in the case of the income tax collected by tax agents). In a rapidly changing environment, this specification may seriously miss true interaction of political and economic variables.
The analysis of outliers contains the following additional robustness checks. First, we check for the normal distribution of residuals (Jarque-Bera test) to make correct inferences in a still small sample. Second, we run all regressions excluding different sets of possible outlier regions: Tatarstan and Bashkortostan (two Russian regions in which not only de facto but also de jure retention rates were set differently from the rest of the federation; see Lavrov, 2005) ; Moscow City (since due to its special status as the capital of Russia it often evolved in a way very different from the rest of the country); and Chukotka (another offshore region similar to Kalmykia or Ingushetia, but established in early 2000s and used primarily by companies belonging to a particular business group of Roman Abramovich). Third, we used a trimmed sample: we do it by excluding all regions which fall in 0.5th and 99.5th percentiles of the tax arrears distribution of the respective year. Fourth, we calculate several other measures of influential observations and estimators robust to outliers suggested in the literature. 4 Finally, there are three further robustness checks we implement. First, we estimate separate regressions (with region fixed effects and two-way fixed effects, as well as median) for Yeltsin and Putin (2000-06) periods. Second, we conduct panel regressions, where we interact tax arrears with individual year dummies instead of Putin (or Putin and Yeltsin) dummies. Third, we estimate a pooled cross-sectional specification (Newey-West standard errors) without fixed effects using OLS and median regressions, adding a set of time-invariant controls suggested by the literature (see Libman, 2010) ; we also include a dummy variable for two regions -Tatarstan and Bashkortostan for the reasons discussed above. 4. One is the robust Mahalanobis distance (setting the percentage of trimming at 1%). For details, see Verardi and Croux (2009) . We calculate the centroid of data using all variables (without fixed effects) and replacing the tax arrears for Yeltsin and Putin periods by a single tax arrears variable. Another measure is Cook's distance (for regression (1) of Tables 3 and 4 ; we take all observations with Cook's distance exceeding 4/N, with N -number of observations, as outliers). We also reestimate this regression using M-estimator: we apply both the Stata routine rreg combining RWLS with exclusion of observations with large Cook's distance and the M-estimator by Verardi and Croux (2009) using region FE. 5. There are reasons to claim that the effect for these two territories differed substantially under Yeltsin and under Putin; hence, the regressions actually include two dummies for these two republics in 1995-99 (Yeltsin) and 2000-06 (Putin) . We use the same approach with the power variable, which was originally composed only for a subperiod of our sample.
Our findings are summarized in Table 5 . Although there is indeed some variation in our results, we still find them robust to most checks we have implemented. The main exceptions are the case when we control for dominant enterprises (it is, however, almost entirely driven by the change of the sample, as re-estimating our baseline regressions for 1997-2002 shows), as well as log tax arrears and some of the checks of outliers (which, therefore, could possibly affect our results). We also find less robust effects for separate samples for Yeltsin and Putin and for pooled OLS specifications; in the latter case, it may be due to the unobserved heterogeneity (because within variation of the tax arrears is high enough to warrant fixed effects specification). Using interaction terms with individual year dummies provide effects entirely consistent not only with Conjecture 1, but also with Conjecture 2.
Number of tax audits and tax arrears
Previously, we have mentioned that the size of tax arrears as proxy for strategic tax collection has certain disadvantages. In particular, it may be difficult to disentangle the effects of strategic tax auditing and strategic tax collection on arrears. Since 2006, tax authority started reporting an alternative indicator, which may be used to complement our study: the number of tax audits performed by the tax collector in a given period (i.e. number of events when the tax collection office visits the taxpayer's premises and control the accounts and records). The data are available only for a subsample including 68 regions. We have collected these data and replicated our regressions for 2006 controlling for the number of tax audits (with and without possible outliers). Table 6 provides a summary of the main findings. We find that the effect of tax collection survives, with some exceptions, in terms of significance and magnitude almost regardless of the tax auditing effort; tax collection has (almost always) a significant and negative effect consistent with the Conjecture 2. Of course, one cannot immediately conclude from the estimation for 2006 that the same effect was present in the whole sample; however, this is at least some evidence in favour of our conjectures, particularly because the problem of disentangling tax collection and tax auditing is more important for the Putin period, when the simple refusals to comply from the side of the companies, so often happening in the Yeltsin age, were not possible any more.
Composition of tax arrears
So far we have rather used an indirect approach assessing the evidence of strategic tax collection. However, it is also possible to attempt a direct test of the strategic behaviour of the tax-collecting agency. For this purpose, one could regress the tax arrears on measures of individual tax bases, as well as (possibly) an interaction term with the Putin dummy. In this case, one should expect the regions with larger tax bases for taxes, which serve as a revenue source for the federal budget, to have a positive effect on tax arrears under Yeltsin, which ought to disappear (or become negative) under Putin; on the contrary, if the tax is mostly attributed to the regional budget, the effect for the tax arrears should be negative.
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There are, unfortunately, several problems with this approach. First, it requires precise measurement of the tax bases, which is very difficult. The aggregate statistical data provide a highly imperfect proxy for the tax base on the regional level; it is typically very difficult even to clearly link individual aggregate variables to particular tax bases. Second, these proxies are strongly correlated with each other, so that the regressions could suffer from multicollinearity. Third, Russia's fiscal system is mostly based on joint taxes, rather than taxes unambiguously attributed to the federal or regional budget; hence, one should expect the tax bases for taxes, which are more relevant for the regional budget, to have a significant and negative impact on the tax arrears under Yeltsin, and the taxes more relevant for the federal budget to have a positive and significant effect. In spite of these limitations, we still attempt to corroborate our results using this additional test.
Specifically, we look at five taxes: real estate tax, personal income tax, corporate profit tax, value added tax and taxes on natural resources (particularly oil and gas). Four taxes mentioned first can be, in spite of all changes in the Russian fiscal system, ranked in terms of their distribution between the federal and the regional budgets: real estate tax is purely regional, personal income tax is mostly regional, corporate profit tax is to a greater extent attributed to the federal budget and value added tax is mostly federal. Taxes on natural resources have been mostly regional under Yeltsin and became federal under Putin. For each tax, we select an indicator, which could serve as a proxy for its tax base. For the real estate tax, we use capital funds. For the personal income tax, we use personal monthly income of the regional population. For the corporate profit tax, we apply the total net profit of the regional companies. For the tax on natural resources, we use total oil and gas extraction (in coal equivalent). For VAT, finally, the choice is particularly difficult, and there exists a large literature dealing with this topic (see e.g. Giesecke and Tran, 2012; Ginebri et al., 2005; Schaffer and Turley, 2000) . We use one of the proxies suggested by the literature and reported by the Russian statistical authorities -the final consumption.
Then, we regress the tax arrears on the proxies of tax bases and an interaction term between these proxies and the Putin dummy, using two-way FE specification. Since tax bases are correlated with each other, we run five regressions with five tax bases separately. Furthermore, we divide all tax bases and the tax arrears by the GRP to account for the fact that large regions are likely to have larger tax arrears as well. Thus, for example, the personal income per unit of GRP could be interpreted as the contribution of labour to the GRP. The regressions are estimated for different samples, accounting for outliers, also based on the inspection of tax base variables themselves (Chukotka for net profits or Moscow City for final consumption).
The results are reported in Table 7 and are entirely in line with our predictions. Capital funds have a negative impact on the tax arrears under Yeltsin (which is insignificant though) and a positive and significant impact under Putin. For personal income, the results are even more convincing: this tax (which, as mentioned, is mostly attributed to the regional budget) significantly reduces tax arrears under Yeltsin and significantly increases them under Putin. The corporate profit tax base -net profits -has the opposite effect: it increases the tax arrears under Yeltsin and typically has no significant effect under Putin. Final consumption is associated with smaller tax arrears under Putin and, if Moscow City is excluded, larger tax arrears under Yeltsin (which is consistent with the fact that VAT is mostly attributed to the federal budget). Oil and gas have no significant effect on the size of tax arrears. Thus, we can conclude that our results are at least consistent with the conjectures made above, and with several caveats, we obtain another confirmation of the existence of strategic tax collection. 
CONCLUSION
The aim of this article is to test whether the strategic manipulations of tax arrears could be used when a central government does not have sufficient information and monitoring capacities for a regional influence on tax collection, and 6. Note further that although tax arrears and some of the tax bases are correlated with each other, in the baseline regressions of Tables 3 and 4 , we can still confirm our main results excluding the proxies of tax bases; thus, multicollinearity does not drive our findings reported above. 
Strategic Tax Collection
regions are able to focus their tax auditing and collection efforts on taxes mostly benefiting their budgets, to re-allocate fiscal resources in favour of the regions. Moreover, we have tested whether federal governments have an incentive to manipulate tax collection in their favour. In order to conduct these tests, we analyse the case of the Russian Federation. Thus, we have tried to understand whether strategic tax collection matters in general, and particularly for fiscal decentralization. Our results support the basic conjectures: there is robust evidence that tax arrears are used strategically to manipulate distribution of taxes between the federal centre and the regions. Under Yeltsin, the regions use strategic tax collection to re-allocate tax revenue in their favour. We find no robust evidence of strategic tax collection under Putin. There are several major implications from our findings. First, our results suggest that the manipulations of tax collection effort by subnational governments can result in a significant deviation of the de facto allocation of fiscal flows from the de jure fiscal decentralization: in spite of lack of de jure authorities, subnational governments manage to capture a larger portion of tax revenue. This issue should be taken into account while assessing or comparing tax systems: a de jure centralized tax system can in fact turn out to be highly decentralized in terms of how actual fiscal flows are allocated. This is an important challenge for research: empirical assessments of consequences of decentralization based on de jure retention rates may be inaccurate, at least for developing countries, if they do not take the informal manipulation of effort in the tax system into account. Second, in line with the second-generation fiscal federalism literature (Weingast, 2009) , our study stresses the crucial role of incentives for local tax collectors, which can be provided by competing governments at the central and the regional levels and thus depend on the balance of power in the federal system. In fact, we show that main changes in the behaviour of tax administrators come from the informal power shifts, even before the formal institutions have changed. This result is confirmed by other studies of the behaviour of Russian tax authorities: Libman et al. (2012) show that in the late 2000s changes of appointment practices and personnel composition of Russian governors allowed them to re-establish close ties to tax collectors. 
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